Bad Incentives

This is a bit long, so forgive me.

I need to give some context to my thoughts; I’ll give it in two pieces of wisdom from my first college econ professor.

1). People respond to incentives.

2). Skewed incentives lead to skewed outcomes.

Parenthetically, these shouldn’t sound groundbreaking—incentives are defined as “that which motivates one to action.” People are motivated by that which motivates them.

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City Schools is riddled with bad incentives (as is education generally). Let me list a few for your perusal and consideration.

1). Schools that suspend too many students for too many years are placed on a “persistently dangerous” list. Instead of leading schools to improve their discipline (by, for example, a tough crack-down on inappropriate behavior) schools are punished for giving consequences. In some cases, I’ve seen administrators issue “off-the-record” consequences, including unofficial ISS or OSS. Other administrators simply stop giving consequences, and let their schools fall into chaos to prevent the perception of a chaotic school.

2). Among my colleagues, City Schools is infamous for promoting people “out” instead of “up.” That is, people are quickly promoted out of the classroom. Network positions, policy positions, governance board, union positions, Hopkins teaching, admin… the list goes on. We are devastatingly good at promoting people out of teaching. In a district that is burdened by high teacher turnover, shouldn’t the incentive be to stay in the classroom?

3). The schools that most need good teachers are the hardest schools to teach in. Those schools have the hardest students, and sometimes have the worst resources, administrators, facilities, and reputations. Worst of all, you are more likely to be punished for lack of student success as a teacher in a hard school than anywhere else. So the best teachers always move to the best schools—even if they stay in the district.

4). I won’t belabor this one—we all know of the incentives regarding failing too many students. If we fail too many kids, a principal will ask us to change their grades, or change them themselves. Worse yet, we get in trouble for holding a high standard if too many kids don’t meet it.

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Dr. Alonso seems to believe (as do many people) that the way to fix skewed incentives is by market-oriented reforms. For example, Baltimore's new teacher contract is meant to curb bad behavior by tenured teachers and encourage good teaching across the board. Schools in New York have even eliminated tenure in exchange for more money to emphasize better incentives. Many people who oppose vouchers support fair student funding, which is just vouchers for public schools only. These are all market-based reforms that are meant to alter mismanaged incentives. Are they working? Are market-based reforms the answer?